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Partisan Infighting Among House Republicans: Leaders, Factions, and Networks of Interests

Congressional parties are commonly viewed as unified legislative teams, but recent intraparty battles have revealed serious ideological divisions within the House Republican caucus. Using annual ratings from nearly 300 interest groups, we estimate the ideological locations of Republican legislators in order to map their party's factional structure. Based on the distribution of interest-group support from 2001 to 2012, we detect three Republican factions that we characterize as worker oriented, pro-business, and ethno-radical. We find that Republican leaders block bills by legislators in the worker and ethno-radical subgroups and that they advance bills by members in the corporate faction.

Historically high levels of congressional polarization have encouraged scholars to view each party as ideologically homogenous (see, e.g., Poole and Rosenthal 2007; Roberts and Smith 2003; Theriault 2008). Yet, since 2010, many House Republicans have defied their party leaders on key issues, often to serve the Tea Party movement. In particular, these members have adopted hardline, populist positions on taxation, the debt ceiling, and immigration reform that so-called establishment Republicans have considered irresponsible (Mann and Ornstein 2012). This internal fighting has made it difficult for leaders of the Republican majority to advance a legislative agenda that broadly satisfies their caucus. The Republican Party is still comprised of conservatives who uniformly oppose Democratic priorities, but its members have often split on the most salient floor votes. As one observer has remarked: "Today's Republican Party is an assemblage of tribes with no real leader" (Sullivan 2013).

The ongoing battle over the Republican agenda has renewed scholarly interest in factions and the ideological composition of congressional parties (e.g., Brady 2010; Kabaservice 2012). But there are no

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established quantitative methods for identifying and measuring the size of intraparty groups in Congress. Consequently, the congressional literature has overlooked a number of important questions on party composition. How does the factional structure of the majority affect its legislative agenda? How do majority-party leaders manage and respond to conflicting factions within their caucus? Do they reward or punish members of various ideological subgroups? In this article, we present a method for detecting multiple factions within the congressional parties, and we examine leadership strategies for maintaining unity within an ideologically divided party. We focus our analysis primarily on House Republicans because their public disagreements over policy and legislation give us an ideal opportunity to examine the dynamics of partisan infighting.

To determine the ideological composition of congressional parties, we examine the collection of interest groups that align with each caucus. Our assumption, following the early insights of Schattschneider (1960) and Truman (1951), as well as more recent observations by Bawn et al. (2012), among others, is that the congressional parties manage a coalition of interests with intense and, at times, competing preferences. These coalitions potentially reveal the ideological makeup of each party. Examining the period from the 107th to the 112th Congress (2001–12), we use annual interest-group scores from a large, diverse set of organizations to estimate the ideological locations of House members and to map the factional structure of the parties. Specifically, we create a bipartite or two-mode network relating interest groups and their annual ratings of all House members. We project this two-mode network to create two separate single-mode networks: (1) where interest groups are related by the similarity in which they score House members and (2) where legislators are related by the similarity in which they have been scored by interest groups. Then, using a hierarchical clustering algorithm on a correlation matrix of similarities between actors, we identify ideological factions within each party.

Our analysis shows that interest groups cluster predictably into two broad camps, split along a liberal-conservative line. Democratic legislators tend to be rated highly by social-justice groups and labor unions; Republicans tend to be rated highly by religious organizations and industry lobbies. Although we find clear evidence of partisan polarization, we also find strong indications of internal party divisions. Notably, within the House Republican caucus, we detect three distinct factions. Each one is rated favorably by a different subset of interest groups, and each one predates the rise of the Tea Party. Based on the distribution of interest-group support across the Republican caucus, we surmise that one

subgroup represents working-class priorities, another reflects business concerns, and a third advocates anti-immigrant and antigovernment positions. We label them, respectively, the lunch-pail faction, the corporate-establishment faction, and the ethno-radical faction.

After identifying these three groups, we see whether Republican leaders in the majority restrain or otherwise penalize legislators based on their factional affiliations. That is, we see whether leaders block bills sponsored by members of certain factions at both the committee and floor stages. Our findings show that Republican leaders deny legislative victories to both the lunch-pail and ethno-radical subgroups in order to retain agenda control for themselves. But we find that Republican leaders most readily thwart the efforts of lunch-pail members. Leaders, we infer, block this group's bills for fear that its measures will prevail against the objections of most Republicans, since minority-party Democrats share the working-class priorities of the lunch-pail faction. Legislation by the ethno-radical subgroup does not represent this same risk and is not blocked as often. We do find, however, that leaders set aside the tax, budget, and immigration bills of the ethno-radical group because its members likely propose extreme policies that, if implemented, would damage the Republican brand. Overall, our study accomplishes two things. It offers a new technique for identifying ideological subgroups and measuring party disunity, and it shows how majority-party leaders attempt to control a factious party.

In the next two sections of this article, we discuss competing views of the congressional parties and explain why they are best understood as networks of policy interests. Next, we discuss our method for detecting ideological subgroups, and we report the results of our social-network analysis. After detecting three Republican factions, we discuss the literature on agenda control and party discipline to identify the main ways that leaders manage bills in order to reward and restrict party subgroups. Then, focusing on the Republican majority, we test and confirm our hypotheses on leadership strategies, and we consider the implications of our findings.

Conceptions of Legislative Parties

Broadly speaking, there are two competing views on the organization and behavior of congressional parties. The most prominent asserts that the two parties operate as legislative teams composed of like-minded members who consistently take policy positions that differ from their partisan rivals (e.g., Aldrich and Rohde 2000; Gerring 1998; Grynaviski 2010; Theriault 2008). Republicans are conservative and seen as the party

of big business, while Democrats are liberal and considered the party of the working class. The second view holds that parties are best understood as complex political organizations that manage a coalition of interest groups with intense policy preferences (e.g., Bawn et al. 2012; Noel 2013; Schattschneider 1960; Truman 1951). This view emphasizes the challenges that party leaders face in trying to satisfy coalition members who often have competing demands. For example, the Democratic Party has a long history of representing the interests of both environmentalists and labor unions, even though these groups have conflicting goals over industrial policy (Koger, Masket, and Noel 2010, 37). At times, then, each party contains factions of legislators who represent different interests, who pursue goals at odds with partisan colleagues, and who attempt to reshape their party's agenda (DiSalvo 2012; Noel 2016).

Although seemingly contradictory, these two views of congressional parties are not incompatible. Both camps contend that the main role of parties is to act as "long coalitions," quelling policy differences among their members and creating the appearance of a united front (Aldrich 2011; Karol 2009). That means a highly coordinated team will have members whose preferences do not align on all major issues, and a factious party will advance legislation that most members support in order to quiet internal policy disputes. Congressional parties can thus have ideological divisions and still project reasonably coherent electoral brands (Koger and Lebo 2017, 2).

Despite the compatibility of the two views, the conception of parties as cohesive legislative teams has generally dominated congressional research. In part, the prominence of one-dimensional spatial models has encouraged scholars to focus extensively on the differences between the parties and oversimplify the configuration of each party (Aldrich, Montgomery, and Sparks 2014). The field's most widely used roll-call scaling methods—including NOMINATE and IDEAL—estimate ideological preferences of members along a single dimension.[1] These methods, as a result, are better at measuring the distance between major voting blocs than capturing the ideological composition of each party (Noel 2013, 15; Poole and Rosenthal 2007, 55–57).[2] Efforts to estimate ideal points in multidimensional settings have provided relatively complex depictions of the parties, but these investigations have examined caucus divisions on only a narrow subset of bills (e.g., Jeong 2013; Jeong et al. 2011).

Research that examines congressional factions, meanwhile, has relied heavily on qualitative analysis to trace the fluctuating influence of key intraparty groups—such as Progressive Republicans and Boll Weevil Democrats (DiSalvo 2012; Rohde 1991). Drawing upon press reports and historical records, this literature has charted the rise and fall

of intraparty groups to explore the changing ideological character of the two parties.[3] But this literature has not provided a consistent operational definition of factions (Belloni and Beller 1976; Reiter 2007). Nor has it developed a consistent method for identifying members of each partisan subunit. As a consequence, it has struggled to determine the size and strength of factions—and thus the level of party disunity—with much precision. Despite these limitations, qualitative examinations have raised important questions about party structures that the congressional field has otherwise neglected.

In sum, the methodological choices of scholars have determined whether they understand legislative parties as cohesive teams or factional organizations. Most likely they function partly in both capacities. To date, scholars have failed to develop a rigorous, quantitative strategy that captures both the polarization of the two parties and the ideological complexity of each party. We present such a method in the next sections of this article.

Defining Congressional Factions

For our purposes, intraparty factions are groups of legislators who hold ideologically cohesive views that differ, in either substance or intensity, from the rest of their party. That is, they represent interests that other copartisans oppose, neglect, or treat as subordinate. While they share important views, faction members do not necessarily see themselves as part of a coherent, identifiable group. Unlike party caucuses, factions lack the formal apparatus to select leaders, maintain membership rolls, and schedule meetings. They are ideological associations, not institutionalized actors. As such, they are best understood as "[t]endency alignments": their members have a tendency to have the same concerns and to work on the same issues (Belloni and Beller 1976, 537).

Since factions reflect distinct interests, we can potentially determine the ideological composition of the two parties by examining the array of interest groups that align with each side. Admittedly, some powerful interest groups, such as the financial-services lobby, provide campaign contributions to both Democratic and Republican members (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2013). But the polarization of the two congressional parties has been mirrored generally by the polarization of interest groups. As research shows, groups that rate legislators based on their voting records have increasingly split into two distinct partisan camps, with liberal groups largely supporting Democrats and conservative groups mostly supporting Republicans (McCarty, Poole, and

Rosenthal 2006, 17). This trend suggests that the two parties represent and work on behalf of opposing interests.

Although they share some important priorities, interest groups aligned with the same party likely have different ideological allies within the party's ranks. Conservative interests, for example, may generally favor reductions in public programs, leading them to support the overall Republican agenda. But because each group has its unique policy goals that distinguish it from the rest of the conservative coalition, each one will presumably favor Republican legislators who work hardest to advance the group's narrow policy objectives. If so, we can identify intraparty factions by tracking the level of support or approval legislators receive from different interest groups within the same partisan coalition. In other words, we can see whether a subset of interest groups coalesces around a subset of party members. We expect such alignments to be rather prevalent because faction members, seeking to raise their influence within a party, often establish connections with prominent interest groups (DiSalvo 2010). Moreover, by examining ties between legislators and special interests, we adopt a strategy that can potentially detect multiple factions within a single caucus. Differences among interest groups in the same coalition may reveal complex factional structures in the congressional parties.

Social Network and Cluster Analyses

To detect intraparty factions and their members, we develop a novel approach that uses social-network methods. First, we collect annual interest-group ratings of legislators from 290 organizations, compiled and made available by Project Vote Smart (2015). These scores provide a valid indicator of interest-group priorities because groups track floor votes to identify policy friends and enemies in Congress and to make decisions about campaign contributions (McKay 2008; Rocca and Gordon 2010). We gather data from a large set of organizations because, in order to identify intraparty divisions, we need to see how legislators are evaluated by diverse interests that reflect a range of ideological priorities and that represent a mix of narrow and broad policy concerns.[4] Additionally, studies that rely on ratings by only a handful of groups tend to see a bimodal distribution of legislators that simply captures the split between parties, not the differences within them (Snyder 1992, 319).

With these interest-group scores, we construct a bipartite network composed of interest groups and House members.[5] In this network, both interest groups and legislators are treated as nodes, and every group has a tie to every legislator. The weight of a tie is determined by the mean-

centered rating an interest group gives to each member between 0 and 100. With this bipartite network in place, we then project two separate networks. The first network projection relates legislators to one another based on the similarity in which they have been rated by interest groups. The second projection relates interest groups by how similarly they have rated legislators. We then apply a hierarchical clustering algorithm to examine the community structure of both networks and to detect factions (for early examples, see Burt 1976, 1978).[6]

This approach captures actors who are structurally equivalent due to the similarity in ideological ties they maintain with different interest groups (Knoke 1994; Wasserman and Faust 1994). The conceptual importance of structural equivalence in network theory is built upon the intuition that actors in a social network with similar ties to others will tend to have similar beliefs and outlooks (for an overview, see Wasserman and Faust 1994). We use interest-group ratings of House members in place of social ties to capture the similarity of legislators across multiple issues. In other words, unlike a typical social-network analysis where ties between actors denote some kind of interaction or social connection, the ties we analyze represent common policy interests. We are essentially using the reputations that legislators have developed through their support of various policy issues over time in order to infer underlying ideological similarities between groups of legislators.

What follows is a description of how the bipartite network relating interest groups and legislators is projected into a network relating legislators to one another. To capture the similarity of ratings for each legislator relative to all other legislators, we create an adjacency matrix containing the correlations between interest-group scores of each member. The rows and columns of the adjacency matrix are legislators. This correlation matrix is symmetric, with each cell containing the correlation coefficient of similarity for each member represented on the row and column of the matrix. By definition, the main diagonal of the matrix is one. In calculating the correlation between two members, we drop cases where an interest group has not rated both members. However, for each congressional session in our study, the coverage across legislators is very nearly complete for 290 interest groups. To ensure consistency, we use at least 80 interest-group ratings common to both legislators in order to calculate a correlation between them. The process of generating the interest-group projection is identical to that used for the legislator network.

Two stylized networks are displayed as examples. Figure 1 shows the cluster analysis applied to interest groups, in which two sides representing traditional liberal and conservative issues are clearly depicted.

FIGURE 1
Interest-Group Clusters in the 112th Congress (2011–12) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]



Note: Nodes are groups; ties are the similarity between each group in its rating of House members. This general pattern of two largely unconnected clusters holds across our sample. The top cluster is comprised of conservative, Republican-leaning groups; the bottom cluster is comprised of liberal, Democratic-leaning organizations.

This finding is consistent with existing studies on the ideological positions and polarization of interest groups using different data and techniques (McKay 2010).

Figure 2 shows ties between ideologically similar House members for the 112th Congress. To measure ideological similarity, we calculate Spearman's correlation coefficient between each member's vector of interest-group ratings. The result is a network relating similarly rated individuals to one another. Then, as noted above, we apply a hierarchical clustering algorithm to this correlation matrix (Dong and Horvath 2007; Ranola et al. 2013). The detected clusters are highlighted, and a

FIGURE 2
Intraparty Factions in the US House, 112th Congress (2011–12)
[Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]



Note: The overlays are detected clusters. The network beneath the overlays shows nodes as House members. Different shades (or colors) are different factions, with Democratic Party factions in the top left and Republican Party factions in the lower right.

simplified group-level network is overlaid in blue and red (representing the Democratic and Republican parties).

For each Congress in our study (the 107th to 112th), we apply the clustering analysis to determine the similarities between legislators based on the ratings they received from all interest groups. To reiterate, this approach takes into account all ratings that are similar, whether similarly high or similarly low.[7] We find that the House Republican Party contains three major subgroups in most Congresses in our period of study. In the next section, we discuss and present a graphical representation of factions over time.

We should note that while the cluster analysis shows both parties are divided, our investigation here does not include House Democrats. We have made this decision because of our substantive interest in the Republican Party and its current disunity but also because of

unavoidable data restrictions. Our analysis assumes a high degree of sincere voting among majority-party members, regardless of factional affiliation, because the majority sets the floor agenda. Likely, majority members only vote against a majority-party bill when they oppose the measure on substantive grounds. Since the minority caucus often opposes majority-party bills for political rather than ideological reasons, it is difficult to identify meaningful divisions within the minority party based exclusively on floor votes (Dion 1997; Lee 2009). And since Democrats had majority control for only two Congresses in our study, we lack a sufficient timeframe for determining whether any observed disunity in the Democratic Party reflects stable factional groupings.

Identifying the Three Republican Factions

Although our analysis identifies ideological differences between intraparty groups, it does not reveal what these ideological differences are. We therefore examine, qualitatively, the interests that underlie the three detected factions in the Republican Party. Here we have space to provide only a brief summary of our method and findings. The online supporting information includes an extensive discussion and supporting evidence.

The logic of our analysis is straightforward. By identifying key interests that favor each faction, we infer what each party subgroup represents in broad policy terms. As a first step, we check whether Republican Party leaders—the speaker, majority leader, and whip—sit consistently in the same cluster across Congresses. Since these leaders are typically in the "middle" of their party (Jessee and Malhotra 2010), we consider any cluster that consistently contains these members to represent the core Republican faction. We find that, across the years of our study, these leaders are generally located in the same subgroup. Of course, while their location provides important insights into the Republican Party's structure, it tells us little about the ideological composition of this or any other faction.

To identify the orientation of each faction, we examine the 15 interest groups in each Congress that provide both the highest and lowest ratings to members within a given cluster. These lists indicate which interest groups have rated factions within parties similarly or differently across years. Differences between the parties are clearly evident. Democrats are generally rated highly by social-justice groups, pro-choice advocates, and labor unions, while Republicans are generally rated highly by corporate interests, antitax lobbies, and conservative religious organizations.

Within a party, the differences are more difficult to discern using this approach. As one might expect, multiple interest groups often provide high scores to the majority of legislators in the same party. That said, looking at the top 15 groups for each cluster, we do see that our core leadership faction receives support mainly from business interests, including construction associations, service- and retail-industry groups, and the US Chamber of Commerce, among others. We conclude that this is the *corporate-establishment faction* of the Republican Party.

Difference in Means

We use another approach to differentiate the remaining two factions. Specifically, we calculate each interest group's mean rating for the House Republican caucus and subtract it from the group's mean score for each detected cluster to generate what we call mean-difference reports. We look for groups with the largest difference in means between the party and a given faction because it indicates that they have provided higher scores to faction members than to other House Republicans. We then examine these organizations to determine the ideological makeup of the two remaining factions.

At first glance, the mean-difference reports reveal important ideological overlap between our corporate-establishment faction and one other Republican subgroup. Indeed, we find that organizations representing pro-gun, pro-life, and low-tax policies appear in both lists. But a closer look reveals that this second faction receives unique support from Tea Party affiliates and radical right-wing groups. The organizations aligned with the Tea Party include Americans for Prosperity and FreedomWorks (both of which predate but have helped support the Tea Party movement); the radical right-wing groups include the John Birch Society, the Gun Owners of America, and English First. Both sets of groups hold hardline, antigovernment positions and advocate policies that are hostile to minorities, especially Hispanic immigrants (Parker and Barreto 2013; Skocpol and Williamson 2012). Additionally, we find that while mainstream antitax groups give broad support to Republicans, these organizations—such as the Club for Growth and the National Taxpayers Union—rate the second subgroup most favorably. Consistent support from this collection of interests suggests that, among party clusters, this second faction represents racial anxieties on one hand and "starve the beast" fiscal conservatism on the other. We therefore call this Republican group the *ethno-radical faction*.

As for the third cluster, we find that it has comparatively little overlap with the other two Republican factions. Few business groups score it

FIGURE 3
Republican Factions in the US House, 107th to 112th Congress (2001–12) [Color figure can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.com]



Note: Each node represents an identified Republican faction, with the number of members written within. The lines joining factions represent the number of common interest-group ratings (in the mean-difference reports) that each faction has across Congresses.

favorably and no Tea Party or anti-immigrant groups give it high ratings—in fact, they give this cluster some of its lowest scores in the mean-difference reports. We do find two types of organizations that differentiate this faction from the rest of the party: labor unions and Hispanic groups. Among these interests, the most prominent are the AFL-CIO, the Federal Employees Association, the United Auto Workers, and La Raza. The presence of labor and Latino groups in the mean-difference reports is hardly contradictory; not only do they hold similar views on labor and poverty issues, but they also work together to promote a common policy agenda (Lazo 1991). Receiving favorable ratings from these interests suggests that, among Republican subgroups, the third faction best reflects the priorities of the working class and blue-collar workers.[8] For this reason, we borrow an old term for worker-friendly conservatives and dub it the *lunch-pail faction*.

Figure 3 shows the factional structure of the Republican Party across the Congresses in our study. This figure relates factions (displayed as nodes) using lines that represent common ratings in each faction's mean-difference reports. We observe the presence of the corporate, ethno-radical, and lunch-pail factions in most periods of majority Republican control, suggesting a relatively consistent set of ideological divisions within the party.[9] However, in the 109th Congress (2005–06),

we do not observe the presence of the ethno-radical faction. What accounts for its absence and thus the apparent reduction in Republican disunity? Two points suggest an answer. First, the absence of the ethno-radical faction does not denote its elimination from the Republican caucus. It simply suggests that, in those two years, Republican members were not divided on issues important to this subgroup of legislators. Second, in the 109th Congress, majority Republican leaders reduced the potential for disagreement by blocking a large proportion of bills. Whereas 9% and 13% of all measures reached the House floor in the 107th and 108th Congresses, respectively, only 6% of all bills made it to the floor in the 109th Congress. This decrease in legislative activity coincided with the loss of the Republican majority in 2006. Leaders likely narrowed the agenda that year, hoping to foster greater party unity and in turn overcome difficult electoral conditions.[10]

This unity appears to have been short-lived because we see the resurgence of the ethno-radical faction in the 110th Congress, following the loss of the Republican majority. Of note, this subgroup's return corresponds with the rise of the Tea Party movement. As Figure 3 indicates, a strong set of common interests links members of the ethno-radical faction across the 110th, 111th, and 112th Congresses—the very period where right-wing activism surged (Skocpol and Williamson 2012). What this initial analysis suggests, then, is that fluctuations in the factional structure of parties may be the result of electoral turnover and exogenous political events. But importantly, it may also be the result of leadership efforts to pull the caucus together. We turn now to this question of what strategies can be adopted to reduce partisan infighting.

Leadership Responses to Factions

Before we can consider how Republican leaders have managed their party's three subgroups, we need to consider how majority-party leaders generally work to maintain caucus unity. Leaders of the majority can use an array of sticks and carrots to encourage party discipline. While they have the capacity to impose severe penalties—such as stripping members of their committee assignments—they rarely take such action. Severe penalties can foster resentments and spark even greater conflicts between leaders and the rank and file. For this reason, leaders prefer to sanction members by withholding favors and rewards—the practice of "[p]unishment by omission" (Green and Bee 2017, 47). With near-absolute control over the floor agenda, leaders have ample opportunity to encourage party discipline through the distribution of legislative rewards, blocking bills by uncooperative members and advancing bills

by party loyalists. Obviously, in bringing up any legislation, majority-party leaders consider, above all, whether a bill unifies their caucus and enhances the party's brand (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005; Koger and Lebo 2017). But since thousands of bills are introduced into Congress each year and many of them cover the same issues and propose the same basic solutions, leaders have considerable latitude in deciding which version of a bill, if any, to push forward (Pearson 2015, chap. 4).

As the level of party disunity increases, leaders of the majority caucus may find it increasingly difficult to block bills by disloyal members. Consistent denial of legislative rewards can be highly punitive because, without a clear record of accomplishment, members struggle to serve constituents and win re-election (Cox and McCubbins 1993; Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991; Pearson 2015). Although leaders may be willing to risk the seats of a few uncooperative members, they cannot consistently deny rewards to a faction whose members are critical to maintaining a floor majority. In doing so, not only would leaders harm the electoral chances of many copartisans and jeopardize their party's majority status, but they would also encourage faction members to vote against leadership bills in retaliation and give the minority caucus opportunity to defeat priority legislation. At the extreme, faction members could even leave the majority, opting either to switch parties or create a new one (Kiewiet and McCubbins 1991, 44).

The challenges for majority-party leaders to maintain caucus unity multiply when they face several factions that all have the size and capacity to upset the floor agenda. Leaders must not only identify a narrow set of policy priorities that unifies an otherwise divided caucus, but they must also find ways to placate competing factions without giving them legislative victories that exacerbate internal rivalries, harm the party brand, or both. For leaders to advance the bills of one subgroup may infuriate the members of another, leaving the leadership in a difficult bind where they risk worsening party divisions whether they block or advance faction bills.

To resolve this dilemma, leaders may adopt a strategy of limited rewards where they allow disobedient members to enjoy legislative victories that fall well short of actual policy victories. For members, the most important accomplishment is to see their bills reach and pass the House floor and potentially become law. But members can earn legislative achievements even if their bills undergo no floor action. For rank-and-file members to have a bill simply reported out of committee represents a tangible success, since the vast majority of bills do not survive panel consideration (Volden and Wiseman 2014, 26). Working closely with committee chairs, majority-party leaders often determine

which bills a panel ultimately reports (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Sinclair 2005, 2006).[11] Leaders can therefore guide faction bills through committees and allow their sponsors to enjoy modest rewards that serve their electoral interests. Yet, at the same time, leaders can use their procedural authority to block these reported bills from the floor and thus avoid public, intraparty battles (Oleszek 2014, chap. 4).

Any faction large enough to rob its party of a floor majority poses some threat to caucus unity. But majority-party leaders are unlikely to dole out restrictions and rewards equally across all subgroups. This is because not all factions represent an equal ideological challenge to their party. A group whose main policy goals are at complete odds with the rest of its caucus poses the most serious threat, since its objective is to shift the party's identity (DiSalvo 2012, 5–7). Granting even minor legislative victories to a divergent subgroup may create serious internal unrest. For such a faction to see its bills reported out of committee would require the majority's contingent on the panel to vote for measures that many of its members oppose, or it would require the chair to let the panel's faction members collaborate successfully with the minority party. Both scenarios represent unacceptable compromises for the rest of the majority caucus. Therefore, leaders likely place the greatest restrictions on, and grant the fewest rewards to, the faction that represents the starkest ideological threat to majority-party unity.

We suspect that leaders of both parties, if confronted with an unruly caucus, would likely adopt a strategy of reward discrimination, where some factions are favored more than others. But we develop hypotheses specific to House Republicans because of our study's timeframe and because of the major internal battles that the party has been suffering. Currently, only the Republican Party has a faction of legislators who are supported by well-funded, ideologically driven activist groups with heavy policy demands (Grossmann and Hopkins 2015).[12]

Withholding Rewards

Although all factions pursue goals that the rest of their party opposes, a group that has overlapping preferences with the minority caucus poses the most serious ideological challenge to its party. By working with the minority, a subgroup increases its chances of passing bills that majority-party leaders would otherwise block from the floor. If successful, the faction would deepen divisions within its party and damage the majority's reputation as an effective legislative team. But even unsuccessful collaborations between faction members and minority legislators have the potential to expose party rifts and tarnish the majority's brand.

Indeed, the minority often enjoys electoral gains when it simply embarrasses the majority (Green 2015). For this reason, leaders of the majority caucus will work with committee chairs to kill faction bills that even remotely appeal to the minority party (Cox and McCubbins 2005; Sinclair 2006, chap. 4).

Of the three Republican subgroups, the lunch-pail faction is most likely to sponsor bills that attract Democratic support. Its relative favorability with labor unions and Latino groups suggests that its members have overlapping goals with the Democratic Party on workers' rights and related issues (Egan 2013; Grossmann and Hopkins 2015). Moreover, the group has priorities that run against the core goals of the corporate-establishment faction where Republican leaders are found. We thus expect that leaders, in an effort to prevent even partial Democratic victories, will check lunch-pail bills at both the committee and floor stages.

Hypothesis 1a: Lunch-pail Republicans will have fewer bills reported out of committee than other members of the Republican majority.
Hypothesis 1b: Lunch-pail Republicans will have fewer bills pass the House than other members of the Republican majority.

Distributing Partial Benefits

A majority-party subgroup that has no common interests with the minority caucus has no incentives to work across party lines. Its general ideological orientation is in step with the rest of the majority caucus, and so its threat to party unity appears to be modest. What distinguishes such a group from the rest of its party is the commitment that its members have to specific policy goals. On issues they care most about, these faction members tend to propose bills that represent uncompromising versions of the majority's agenda items. As lawmakers, they are ideological "purists" who care more about implementing core party principles than seeing their party win majorities (Cohen et al. 2008, 91; see also Noel 2016). Other party members may be sympathetic to the purist priorities, but they often prefer versions of bills that appeal to a broader set of voters and interests. This difference between ideological purists and the rest of the majority caucus has the potential to spark internal rifts. While majority-party leaders have the capacity to block overly ideological measures and to push alternative proposals, they risk triggering a backlash from faction members and interest groups that demand the majority adopt ideologically pure positions. Since these groups have the strongest convictions, they have a willingness to engage in lengthy fights to obtain

their preferred outcomes (Egan 2013; Noel 2016). They may even strategically oppose their party on core issues to satisfy the most ideologically driven constituents (Kirkland and Slapin 2014).

Based on their interest-group support, the ethno-radical faction appears to be comprised of members whose priorities—especially on immigration and taxes—are much more hardline than the rest of the Republican Party. For Republican leaders, the challenge is to assuage this faction and yet resist its most extreme demands. One way that Republican leaders can accomplish these conflicting goals is to usher ethno-radical bills through committee and thus grant the group its token rewards, but then block these same bills from the House floor and replace them with legislative measures that have broader appeal. We expect leaders to adopt this two-pronged approach with the ethno-nationalists.

Hypothesis 2a: Ethno-radical Republicans will have more bills reported out of committee than other members of the Republican majority.
Hypothesis 2b: Ethno-radical Republicans will have fewer bills pass the House than other members of the Republican majority.

Regression Models and Results

To see whether Republican Party leaders block legislation from particular factions, we use data from the Congressional Bills Project to construct two dependent variables (Adler and Wilkerson 2015). The first variable is the number of bills a member sponsors that are reported out of committee; the second variable is the number of bills a member sponsors that pass the House.[13] Commemorative bills are excluded from the analysis because they have negligible impact on a party's agenda (Cox and Terry 2008).

We use our findings from the cluster analysis to derive the two key explanatory variables in this study. First, we create the dummy variable *Lunch-Pail Faction* to denote whether a Republican legislator belongs to the subgroup representing working-class interests. Second, we construct the dummy variable *Ethno-Radical Faction* to indicate whether a Republican legislator belongs to the subgroup that reflects nationalist, antigovernment preferences. Since we argue that leaders adopt legislative strategies to manage ideologically complex parties, we need to see how well our indicators of faction membership perform against conventional ideal-point estimates of legislators. Using first-dimension DW-NOMINATE data, we create the variable *Distance from Majority Median* to measure each member's position relative to the ideological

median of the majority party. By adding this variable to our models, we can see whether factional membership or NOMINATE scores best explain the legislative success rate of Republican House members.

Additionally, we include several control variables in our analyses. Tracking the number of bills that a legislator has sponsored in past years, we construct the variable *Previous Bills* to account for a member's legislative experience.[14] Presumably, productive members will enjoy relatively high levels of bill success regardless of factional membership. We also include a *Leadership* variable to indicate whether a member holds a senior position—including speaker, leader, and whip—in either party. Because of their agenda-setting powers, majority-party leaders typically see their bills pass the House (Volden and Wiseman 2014).[15] But membership in the majority accords legislative advantages even to the rank and file. For this reason, we follow Cox and Terry (2008) and create a *Majority Party* variable that indicates whether a member has majority or minority status; we then interact this dummy with all independent variables to determine the effect of majority status on bill success for each Republican member. Additionally, we add a time trend to the models to alleviate concerns of a systematic process affecting our results. Correlations among variables and summary statistics are reported in the online supporting information.

Because our dependent variables are counts of bills, we opt to use a negative binomial model to deal with overdispersed data. Before conducting regression analyses, we check whether our two outcomes are highly correlated. We presume that a bill reported out of committee has an increased chance of reaching and passing the House floor. Not surprisingly, we find a strong correlation between bills reported and bills passed ($r = 0.85$), suggesting that majority-party leaders often make joint decisions on a bill's success at the committee and floor stages. If so, conducting separate regressions for each dependent outcome may produce correlated errors and inefficient estimates. We therefore opt to use a seemingly unrelated negative binomial model to generate coefficients.[16] Table 1 displays our main findings.

First, we conduct a regression that includes only one variable of interest, *Distance from Majority Median*. This approach allows us to see whether a member's proximity to the majority median on the NOMINATE scale has a strong, positive relationship with bill success at the committee and floor stages. Column 1 shows results for bills reported out of committee, and column 2 presents results for bills that pass the House. We find no significant coefficients for the interaction term between *Majority Party* and *Distance from Majority Median*. In other words, majority members see no legislative advantage in being close to

TABLE 1
Seemingly Unrelated Negative Binomial Regression Analyses of Bills Reported Out of Committee and Bills Passed in the House

Independent Variables	(1) Reported *b/se*	(2) Passed *b/se*	(3) Reported *b/se*	(4) Passed *b/se*
Constant	3.138 (19.514)	−0.129 (0.094)	11.205 (19.811)	15.213 (19.637)
Distance from Majority Median	0.096 (0.074)	0.321*** (0.065)		
Lunch-Pail Faction			0.614*** (0.154)	0.820*** (0.136)
Ethno-Radical Faction			−0.604** (0.196)	0.267+ (0.152)
Previous Bills	0.001+ (0.000)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Leadership	−1.468* (0.737)	−1.770+ (0.963)	−1.251* (0.636)	−1.652+ (0.997)
Majority Party	1.104*** (0.083)	0.888*** (0.075)	1.230*** (0.095)	1.208*** (0.095)
Time Trend	−0.002 (0.010)	−0.004 (0.010)	−0.006 (0.010)	−0.008 (0.010)
Majority Interactions[a]				
M * Distance from Majority Median	−0.239 (0.172)	−0.248 (0.160)		
M * Lunch-Pail Faction			−0.743*** (0.173)	−0.965*** (0.163)
M * Ethno-Radical Faction			0.382+ (0.213)	−0.570** (0.173)
M * Previous Bills	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)	0.004*** (0.001)
M * Leadership	1.253 (0.912)	2.148* (0.911)	1.049 (0.805)	2.067* (0.921)
N	2513	2513	2513	2513

[a]Coefficients reported below this point are from interactions of the majority-party dummy and our independent variables.
$+ < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

the ideological center of their party at either stage of the legislative process. This null finding suggests that we need to move beyond a one-dimensional analysis of congressional parties to understand the strategies of leaders and the bill success of members.

After conducting this initial analysis, we rerun the regression of our two-equation model, but this time we include our faction variables. As noted earlier, we expect that Republican members of the lunch-pail subgroup will have fewer bills reported out of committee and fewer bills pass the House than their partisan colleagues. Majority Republican leaders, we posit, will frequently block legislation by these members to prevent Democrats from providing decisive support to this faction's bills and hijacking the agenda. As we see in columns 3 and 4, estimates for the interaction term between *Majority Party* and *Lunch-Pail Faction* are negative and significant in both equations. These findings verify our first set of hypotheses.

Equally interesting, estimates for the same faction variable are positive and significant when it is not interacted with the majority-party term. That means even though lunch-pail Republicans face legislative obstacles in times of majority Republican control, they appear to enjoy a relatively high degree of legislative success in periods of Democratic majority control. This increased success under Democrats indicates that these lawmakers, given the opportunity, defect from their partisan camp to make bipartisan deals. Their relatively high ratings from Latino and labor groups suggest that they likely have overlapping preferences with Democrats on wage and working-class issues. But this overlap also reinforces why Republican leaders in the majority restrict these members' legislative opportunities.

As for the ethno-radical subgroup, we predict that members of this Republican faction will often see their bills reported out of committee but will not see their bills pass the House. This strategy, we contend, enables majority Republican leaders to assuage members with the most intense and extreme positions, without handing over the legislative agenda to them. In column 3, we see a significant and positive result for the interaction term between *Majority Party* and *Ethno-Radical Faction*. In other words, we find that members of the nationalist, antigovernment subgroup are much more likely to have their bills leave committee than other Republican legislators. Conversely, in column 4, we see a negative and significant result for this same interaction term, suggesting that these same members are unlikely to see their bills reach the floor. Our second set of hypotheses is confirmed.[17]

To explore this faction's treatment further, we consider whether bills most central to the ethno-radical group are blocked from floor

TABLE 2
Negative Binomial Regression Analysis of Immigration, Civil Rights, Tax, and Budget Bills Passed in the House

Independent Variables	(5) b/se
Constant	1.066 (48.666)
Lunch-Pail Faction	0.182 (0.570)
Ethno-Radical Faction	0.639 (0.439)
Previous Bills	−0.006 (0.019)
Leadership	−5.032 (32.366)
Majority Party	1.364*** (0.273)
Time Trend	−0.002 (0.024)
Majority Interactions[a]	
M * Lunch-Pail Faction	5.111 (32.335)
M * Ethno-Radical Faction	−1.197* (0.558)
M * Previous Bills	0.037+ (0.020)
M * Leadership	5.111 (32.335)
χ^2	97.088
DF	10
N	1339

Note: The population average estimator implements Huber-White standard errors.
[a]Coefficients reported below this point are from interactions of the majority-party dummy and our independent variables.
$+ < 0.10$, $*p < 0.05$, $**p < 0.01$, $***p < 0.001$ (two-tailed).

consideration. As noted earlier, we determine from interest-group ratings that this faction represents anti-immigrant, antiminority, and antitax positions. On these issues, faction members likely offer hardline bills that, if passed, would paint other Republicans as equally nativist and fiscally regressive. A strong, second test of our hypothesis, then, is to see whether Republican leaders block this group's bills on civil rights, minority rights, immigration, social-welfare policy, taxes, and government funding.

We identify appropriate measures from the Policy Agendas Project and then conduct a count-model regression using this subsample of bills.[18] Table 2 reports the coefficients for this equation. It shows a negative and significant result for the ethno-radical faction, indicating that its members see their core bills routinely blocked by majority Republican leaders. Combined, estimates in Tables 1 and 2 verify our predictions that the Republican leadership uses a dual legislative strategy for ethno-radical members, providing them with important but ultimately limited rewards.

To summarize, confirmation of our hypotheses suggests that Republican leaders employ relatively sophisticated strategies for managing factions, maintaining party unity, and controlling the floor agenda. Although they consistently penalize lunch-pail Republicans by killing their bills in committee and denying their bills floor consideration, leaders accommodate members of the ethno-radical faction, to some degree, by allowing their measures to be reported out of committee. This inconsistent treatment of subgroups suggests that majority-party leaders are not simply interested in controlling the agenda; they are also interested in keeping the peace. They repress lunch-pail bills readily, without fear of pushback from the rest of the party, because this group's bills could gain unwanted Democratic support. By contrast, they allow the ethno-radical faction to enjoy victories at the prefloor stage in order to placate their most fervent caucus members. But in the end, leaders prevent these members' bills from reaching the floor and saddling the party with untenable policies.

Conclusion

At the outset, we noted that ongoing dissension within the Republican Party appears to challenge the conception of congressional parties as unified legislative teams. We thus posited, in contrast with much of the congressional literature, that the two parties can be polarized and internally divided. To explore this possibility, we developed a new method for identifying ideological factions within the parties, using annual ratings of legislators from nearly 300 interest groups. Our analysis showed that the two congressional parties are indeed highly polarized. More important, it revealed major ideological divisions within the parties, and it identified the interests that unite and divide party factions. We focused our investigation on House Republicans, in part because of recent Tea Party activity, and we found that Republican legislators have been ideologically divided well before the rise of the Tea Party movement. Finally, we considered how Republican leaders manage and respond to different intraparty factions, and we determined that while they block bills by both the lunch-pail faction and the ethno-radical subgroup, they restrict lunch-pail Republicans to the greatest extent.

In all, our results suggest that the ideological structure of legislative parties is complex, and that, consequently, the parties require skilled, strategic leaders to hold them together. The conventional view that the majority, in a polarized environment, works eagerly to steamroll the minority is only half the story. The other half is that majority-party leaders—or at least, majority Republican leaders—employ different

strategies to keep different factions in line. Moreover, even when some factions enjoy greater accommodations than others, they all see their most important bills blocked from the floor. In biblical terms, the leadership giveth and taketh away.

Not only does this article complicate our understanding of the congressional parties, but it also opens several new avenues of research. If Republican leaders in the House consistently block bills by the lunch-pail faction, what accommodations can they make to keep this subgroup committed to the party? More broadly, what rewards can leaders give to factions that cooperate with the opposition without, in turn, angering the rest of the majority caucus and creating deeper divisions? Turning to the upper chamber, does the Republican Party in the Senate have the same factional structure as the Republican Party in the House? If so, do Republican leaders in both chambers manage factions similarly to maintain party unity, or do the different rules and procedures of the two houses force leaders to adopt different strategies? And do Democratic leaders in the majority use the same mix of carrots and sticks that Republican leaders use, or do they develop unique solutions for their intraparty divisions? Looking at these issues from the other side, what strategies do factions in the majority caucus adopt to advance their legislative goals? Under what conditions are they successful in shaping the majority's priorities? And do all factions, regardless of ideological preferences, use the same basic approaches to push and fulfill their agenda? Many of these questions warrant separate investigations, suggesting that much work remains in trying to understand internal party dynamics.

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NOTES

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1. However, Carroll and colleagues note that "both NOMINATE and IDEAL can be and often are used to estimate multidimensional issue spaces" (2009, 556).

2. For a number of reasons, roll-call scaling methods may even overstate the level of partisan polarization in Congress (see Roberts and Smith 2003; Snyder 1992).

3. DiSalvo (2012) relies entirely on qualitative sources to identify factions and their key members. Rohde (1991), as a first step, uses press reports to list and characterize Democratic and Republican factions; he then uses party-unity scores, based on roll-call votes, to demonstrate the strength and prevalence of intraparty splits.

4. The influence that interest groups have on parties and party subgroups obviously varies. But we treat all groups the same in our analysis because we receive just as much insight about Republican factions from groups with no influence on the party as we do from groups with tremendous influence. One reason that we can spot ideological divisions within the Republican caucus is that some liberal, Democratic-leaning organizations provide relatively favorable ratings to some Republican legislators.

5. A full list of interest groups is found in the online supporting information.

6. The process of projection works as follows. For each individual legislator, we have a vector of ratings by all interest groups. In order to project our two-mode network (where both interest groups and legislators are nodes) into a one-mode network (with only legislators as nodes), we use the correlation between the vector for each legislator. To use this correlation between the ratings of each member simplifies the relationships and results in a one-mode network, which relates legislators to one another based on how similarly they have been rated by interest groups.

7. For example, two legislators would be considered similar if both consistently received high scores from one set of groups or low scores from a different set of groups.

8. Simply because Hispanic groups provide relatively high scores to the lunch-pail faction does not indicate that this Republican subgroup fully supports a Hispanic policy agenda. It indicates, rather, that its preferences on some issues are closer to Latino interests than those of other Republican factions. Likely, this overlap pertains to labor concerns, not immigration policy.

9. To determine the boundaries of each cluster requires some interpretation. In a few cases, small "factions" are detected that we conclude belong to larger, similar subgroups. We make judgments about the ideological similarity of clusters using our interest-group reports. A full explanation of the clustering method is presented in the online supporting information.

10. Similar factors may explain why we see only two Republican factions in the 111th Congress. But as we note elsewhere, we also expect to see fewer factions in the minority party because its political incentives to oppose the majority likely inflate caucus unity.

11. Moreover, committee chairs have strong incentives to work with majority-party leaders; otherwise, they see their bills blocked and their panels bypassed (Bendix 2016).

12. While we agree with Grossmann and Hopkins that the Republican Party has undergone asymmetric polarization, our analysis differs from theirs to some degree. They argue that the Republican Party is best understood as "the agent of an ideological

movement" (2015, 120), as opposed to a coalition of interests. By contrast, we view the party as representing both a collection of interests and a range of ideological priorities. We see no clear division between the two.

13. Alternatively, to test our hypotheses, we could use the number of bills sponsored by a member that simply reach the House floor. But using this variable would not meaningfully change the results of our analysis because, except for a handful of legislative measures in each Congress, all bills that reach the House floor also pass the House floor (Cox and McCubbins 2005).

14. We substituted the *Previous Bills* variable with a *Tenure* variable, which was constructed using the number of years a member has served in the House. The overall results were the same.

15. We also included a committee-leadership variable as a control; our findings were unchanged.

16. As robustness checks, we conducted separate negative binomial regressions for each dependent variable, using three different model specifications—population average, fixed effects, and random effects—to ensure consistent findings. The results are reported in the online supporting information and support our predictions.

17. Two factors potentially bias our results in Table 1. First, if faction members recognize that they have little chance of seeing their bills reach the floor, they may introduce a large number of measures to show constituents that while they may not be legislatively successful, they are nonetheless legislatively productive. Therefore, we checked whether one faction, given its size, produces a greater proportion of bills than other subgroups. We found no evidence of a cluster being overproductive. Second, if several committees are stacked with ethno-radical members, their success in seeing bills reported out of committee may be because of their dominance on key panels and not, as hypothesized, because of a leadership strategy. To explore this possibility, we checked the distribution of faction members across committees and, for the most part, found that they were evenly distributed across panels. In other words, the ethno-radical faction did not see its bills reported out of committee at relatively high rates because it controlled a handful of panels. We include the results of this robustness check in the online supporting information.

18. We include all bills from the following categories in the Policy Agendas Project: Tax Bills (107, 2009); Migrant and Seasonal Workers (529); Civil Rights, Minority Issues, and Civil Liberties (200, 201, 202, 206); Social Welfare (1300, 1301, 1302); Government Operations (2000, 2002, 2004).

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Supporting Information

Additional Supporting Information may be found in the online version of this article:

Organizations and Annual Scores
Network and Clustering Strategies
Matrix of Correlations between Legislators
Clustering Approaches
Interpreting Results
Qualitative Analysis: Characterizing Intraparty Subgroups
The Corporate-Establishment Faction
The Ethno-Radical Faction
The Lunch-Pail Faction
Mean-Difference Report: Corporate-Establishment Faction
Mean-Difference Report: Ethno-Radical Faction
Mean-Difference Report: Lunch-Pail Faction
Summary Statistics and Robustness Checks
References